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The Court of Appeals agreed with B.P. that failing to provide a safe working environment aboard
a vessel is a maritime tort. It found that although the liftboat was not "under sail," it nevertheless
qualified as a vessel in navigable waters, thus satisfying Grubert' s location requirement. Furthermore,
the Court, noting that a shipowner, or charterer in control of a vessel, owes a duty of care to those
working on the vessel with respect to the condition of the ship' s gear, equipment, tools and work space
observed that the United States Supreme Court has consistently applied maritime law to actions arising
out of the failure to perform such duties. Thus, Strong' s claim that his injury arose out of unsafe,
cluttered working conditions on the liftboat deck sounded in maritime law.
The Court of Appeals held that because Strong alleged a traditional maritime tort, federal
maritime law applied of its own force and precluded the incorporation of Louisiana law under OCSLA.
Accordingly, Strong's claim was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations, and the court
remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of B.P.
Daniel Ginzburg
Class of 2007

DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING VESSEL OWNERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN SUIT BROUGHT SEEKING DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY
The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit reversed an order of the district court
granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant vessel owners, stating that there were
genuine issues of material fact concerning Plaintiff's claim of the vessel's unseaworthiness in
violation of general maritime law and claim of negligence in violation of the Jones Act.

Churchwell v. Bluegrass Marine, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit
444 F.3d 898
(Decided April 2 1 , 2006)
Plaintiff Glenda Churchwell was employed as a cook on Defendants' ship, the Marie Hendrick.
Plaintiff brought an action in United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky to
recover damages for personal injury sustained during her employment. According to the Plaintiff, she
was instructed by a crewman to store excess cooking grease in a metal coffee can. On one occasion,
Plaintiff poured grease from the skillet into a coffee can in accordance with those instructions. She then
picked up the coffee can by pinching its rim, inserting her thumb into the can while placing her other
four fingers on the exterior of the can. Because the interior of the can was covered in grease, the coffee
can slipped from her grip and fell onto a mat on the floor. Plaintiff stepped away from the spill, slipped
in the grease and sustained injuries to her back.
Plaintiff argued that she would not have dropped the can had she been provided with a container
with handles in which to store the grease, and that she would not have slipped if the floor had been
properly furnished with a grease mat that had holes to redirect the spilled grease. She also contended that
the combination of these two factors created a dangerous work environment that caused the accident and
her resulting injuries.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, suggesting that the manner in which the Plaintiff
picked up the grease can was negligent and the sole proximate cause of the accident. Defendants also
argued they had not breached any legal duty by providing an umeasonably dangerous work
environment. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that there
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was no evidence that the Marie Hendrick was unseaworthy or that Defendants had breached their duty
of "ordinary prudence" under the Jones Act. Plaintiff appealed.
Under the doctrine of seaworthiness, a ship owner is strictly liable for injuries that are caused by
his or her vessel's 'unseaworthiness.' Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc. , 362 U.S. 539, 549 ( 1 960). A
vessel is deemed unseaworthy if the vessel and its appurtenances are not "reasonably fit for their
intended use." !d. at 550. In general, the issue of unseaworthiness is a question of fact for a jury. Cook
th Cir. 1 995).
v. American S. S. Co. , 5 3 F.3d 733, 742 (6
In order to prevail on a claim of unseaworthiness, a Plaintiff must prove that a vessel's
unseaworthy condition was the proximate cause of injury to the Plaintiff. The proximate cause
requirement is satisfied if the vessel's unseaworthiness played a substantial part in causing the injury
and the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of unseaworthiness.
Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc. , 845 F.2d 1 347, 1 3 54 (5 th Cir. 1 988).
The Court found that Plaintiff's testimony created a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
whether the absence of grease mats and a container with a handle rendered the Marie Hendrick
unseaworthy. The Court noted that a vessel could be considered unseaworthy if it contained defective
gear, was missing necessary gear or because its crew was instructed to use unsafe work methods. The
Court also found that because reasonable people could disagree as to whether the absence of grease mats
and a handled container conditions were substantial factors causing Plaintiffs injury, the question of
proximate causation was properly an issue for the jury' s determination. As a result, Plaintiff had
introduced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to both elements of an
unseaworthiness claim: 1 ) a vessel's unseaworthy condition; and 2) proximate causation.
The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, authorizes seamen to maintain negligence actions for personal
injury suffered in the course of employment. Under the Jones Act, an employer has a duty to provide a
safe workplace for its employees, and, in order to sustain a claim under the Act, a plaintiff must show
that her employer breached this duty by neglecting to cure or eliminate obvious dangers of which the
employer or its agents knew or should have known. Rannals v. Diamond Jo Casino, 265 F.3d 442, 449
(6th Cir. 200 1 ). Once a plaintiff establishes that the employer breached his duty of care, the plaintiff need
not establish proximate causation, but merely that the defendant's actions contributed in some way
toward causing the plaintiffs injuries. Miller v. Am. President Lines, LTD, 989 F.2d 1 450, 1 463 (6th
Cir. 1 993).
The Court, noting that the requisite level of causation was lower under the Jones Act than under
a claim of unseaworthiness, stated that Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to each element of her Jones Act claim: 1 ) the kitchen was unreasonably
dangerous; 2) the dangerous condition cause Plaintiff to fall; and 3) Defendants should have known
about the dangerous condition. Thus, Plaintiffs Jones Act claim should have been submitted to the jury.
The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in granting Defendants' motion for
summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs unseaworthiness and Jones Act claims. The Court stated that
Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact concerning elements
of each of these claims. The Court also noted that because maritime law espouses the concept of
comparative negligence, Plaintiff's alleged negligent acts would not bar recovery. The Court added that
the only exception to this rule was the primary duty doctrine, under which an employee responsible for
maintaining safe conditions may not sue his employer for his own failure to maintain such conditions.
This doctrine was held inapplicable to the instant case. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the
order of the district court granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and remitted the case
for trial.
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